Engaging the shooter is ESTABLISHED PROTOCOL and every law enforcement agency in America is aware of it.
Unarmed teachers rush into harms way to aid children, we must expect the same from our officers first at the scene.
The Uvalde officers stopped engaging the shooter and did not re-enter- even when their numbers increased at the scene. Did their department train them correctly and equip them adequately for this type of incident?
No further study is necessary. No further analysis is needed.
This was the same terrible outcome as other non-engaged shooter incidents. We know what happens when law enforcement fails to engage- we have too many deadly examples.
The Texas incident is virtually identical to the Columbine HS response, where law enforcement formed a perimeter outside waiting for the arrival of SWAT as kids were hunted down and slaughtered.
The difference is that there wasn’t an effective plan in place at the time of Columbine. This department should have been well aware of the established protocol.
The response and actions of these officers demonstrate a failure of the department/city for not having trained officer/s with long guns and higher grade protective gear in the field . A small department has logistical challenges, it would need to be their patrol officers who are tasked with this responsibility.
A critical part of risk assessment/prevention is hardening against the known and common threats- Police trained to respond to a mass shooter is a must today.
More from Texas;
In active shooter situations, police officers are trained to confront the shooter immediately — not to wait.
But in this week’s elementary school shooting in Uvalde, Texas, the gunman spent more than an hour inside the school before a tactical unit killed him, despite officers’ earlier arrival. That has raised questions about the police response — and whether some of the 19 children and two teachers who died might have been saved if officers had taken a different approach.
“When there’s an active shooter, the rules change,” Texas Department of Public Safety Director Steve McCraw told journalists on Friday, as he gave the most complete account yet of the tragedy that unfolded at Robb Elementary.
McCraw identified a crucial flaw in the police strategy: The incident commander on the scene believed the situation had moved from being an active shooter scenario to one where the gunman had barricaded himself inside the school, McCraw said, with “no kids at risk,” because any civilians inside were already dead.
That left a mass of officers waiting for tactical gear and keys to unlock a door, while at least two students inside frantically called 911 to plead for help.
“From the benefit of hindsight, where I’m sitting now, of course it was not the right decision,” McCraw said. “It was the wrong decision, period. There’s no excuse for that.”
“Those kids need help” immediately, an expert says
There are few national standards when it comes to policing, but there is some consistency. In the years since the Columbine school shooting, law enforcement officers have been trained to engage an active shooter as soon as possible.
“The protocol is, as soon as you determine there is an active shooter you don’t wait for anyone,” says Steve Ijames, an expert who has led training sessions on active-shooter situations for police agencies since the mid-1990s.
“You enter and move [to] neutralize and it may be at your peril,” Ijames said. “It’d be great if you had some help — but I can assure you those kids need help more than you need help.”
After the gunman shot at police officers in Uvalde, they called for resources like body armor and marksmen, assuming he was barricading himself inside. But McCraw said on Friday that if police believed people were still alive in the school, they would have been obligated to show greater urgency. There were “19 officers in there,” he said, adding, “there’s plenty of officers to do whatever needed to be done.”
A good example of a small town department response plan;
Teachers engaging the attacker immediately;
LEB is a great resource for active shooter incidents and more. Here is some data from the site
It is critical that every department trains for and develops a response to this type of incident because the first responding officers MUST engage the typically well armed shooter.
Responding officers must recognize that more than half of mass-shooting incidents—
57 percent—still will be underway,
75 percent requiring law enforcement personnel to confront the perpetrator before the threat ends.
And, one-third of those officers will be shot as they engage.
First responders face the threat of force as part of their daily jobs. Although tactical teams, such as SWAT, train for barricade situations and multiple-member entries, active-shooter training focuses on five-person-or-less building entries. Responding officers may not previously have trained to face this unique type of threat. According to SC Combs, “We’ve been asked to do our part to help law enforcement better prepare for the next Newtown. With so many officers engaged in shootings, it’s important we do whatever we can to help try to change that and make them safer.”
- Active-shooter incidents often occur in small- and medium-sized communities where police departments are limited by budget constraints and small workforces.10
- The average active-shooter incident lasts 12 minutes. Thirty-seven percent last less than 5 minutes.11
- Overwhelmingly, the offender is a single shooter (98 percent), primarily male (97 percent). In 40 percent of the instances, they kill themselves.12
- Two percent of the shooters bring IEDs as an additional weapon.13
- In 10 percent of the cases, the shooter stops and walks away. In 20 percent of the cases, the shooter goes mobile, moving to another location.14
- Forty-three percent of the time, the crime is over before police arrive. In 57 percent of the shootings, an officer arrives while the shooting is still underway.15
- The shooter often stops as soon as he hears or sees law enforcement, sometimes turning his anger or aggression on law enforcement.16
- Patrol officers are most likely responding alone or with a partner. When responding alone, 75 percent had to take action.17
- A third of those officers who enter the incident alone are shot by the intruder.18
How the NYPD responds to mass shooting incidents;
“I never expected my son to do something like that,” Ramos, 42, added. “He should’ve just killed me
He maintained that his son “was a good person” who was bullied at school over his clothes, which is why he dropped out.
“He was a quiet person, stuck to himself. He didn’t bother nobody. People were always bothering him,” the father said.